Tim Ryles | January 1, 2007
A review of cases in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Mississippi, indicates that insurance agents are attracting a considerable amount of attention from plaintiffs. Unlike insurance company defendants, whose cases will most likely be tried in federal court (the preferred venue for defendant insurers), many agents will appear in state court.
Companies and their producers may end up in different venues because of provisions in federal laws creating the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and the nature of the pleadings. Under federal law, matters related to improper administration or adjustment of claims under the NFIP are issues falling exclusively under federal jurisdiction. Questions relating to procurement of flood insurance fall within the state's authority.
A recurring theme of agent cases is the allegation (denied by agents) that "My agent told me I didn't need flood insurance." In Carr v. David Denison and Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance, for example, the Carrs contend that agent Denison specifically advised them against purchasing flood insurance. Relying on this advice, the Carrs did not purchase flood insurance and suffered losses during Katrina. Other cases contain similar charges.
Perhaps the best known case is Leonard v. Nationwide. In Leonard, the agent advised against purchasing flood insurance "unless they (the Leonards) lived in a flood prone area (Flood Zone A) where flood insurance was required in connection with mortgage loans." Since there was "no evidence in the record establishing the standard of care applicable to an insurance agent who is asked about the advisability of purchasing flood insurance," the court drew no conclusions about agent negligence. Further, the court could find no evidence in the record pertaining to the "standard of care for the training of insurance agents who are authorized to sell and interpret flood insurance policies." The decision does not address the issue as to whether the agent's actions should have been addressed in state as opposed to federal court.
Leonard may represent a roadmap for plaintiffs who harbor ill feelings about agent conduct. For example, Leonard suggests that to hold agents liable for negligence, insureds are advised to present evidence of agent training about the flood insurance program, agent duty to advise, and general standards of care expected of insurance producers in Mississippi.
Tests for agent liability may be viewed as a continuum. At one extreme is agent as order taker in which the agent—purchaser relationship is strictly a commercial one and liability for negligence is extremely unlikely. At the other extreme is a fiduciary role in which the agent's duty is to act in the best interest of the insured. A fiduciary relationship will most likely support a liability allegation. At some point along the continuum is a "special relationship" with an insured. This is "A nonfiduciary relationship having an element of trust, arising especially when one person trusts another to exercise a reasonable degree of care and the other knows or ought to know about the reliance." (Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed.)
Black's defines reasonable care as "the degree of care that a prudent and competent person engaged in the same line of business or endeavor would exercise under similar circumstances."
According to Webster's New World College Dictionary, prudent means "capable of exercising sound judgment in practical matters, esp. as concerns one's own interests; cautious or discreet in conduct, circumspect, not rash." Competent means "well qualified; capable; fit."
The definition of reasonable care is in the conjunctive (prudent and competent).
While defenses of "it is custom and practice in the industry" are often raised on behalf of agents, i.e., the agent acted as everyone else in the business of selling insurance acts, unless custom and practice conform to standards of prudence and competence, this defense will probably fail. Persons who doubt this only need to recall New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's attacks on a widespread custom and practice in the industry relating to contingent commissions. Other examples abound.
The actual character of the agent-insured relationship, however, is a fact driven determination based on the nature of the relationship and not necessarily on how long the parties have dealt with one another. The pursuit of several questions aids in determining where the relationship rests along the continuum.
Answers to these questions will assist fact-finder juries to determine whether the relationship is one in which the agent can be held liable for failure to meet the requisite standard of care.
Recent developments in agent training, especially the emphasis on mandatory courses covering principles of ethical behavior, may create problems for agent defendants. Agents are required to take continuing education courses. The course materials and the instructors are approved by the state Departments of Insurance. In essence, an agent's schooling represents a form of state action. Consequently, what agents are taught, as suggested by the court in Leonard, should be of interest to the courts. Certainly, the printed material on which this training is based will likely be subjects of discovery and close analysis as Katrina cases proceed. To illustrate its relevance to Judge Senter's suggested queries in Leonard, I cite the following examples from The Market Conduct Handbook for Agents published by BISYS Education Services which, inter alia, includes the following admonitions to agents:
In some respects, the standards appearing in the training material on ethical practices are ahead of common law relating to agent conduct. In effect, then, there may be two sets of standards; what the common law of the state recognizes and what the state-approved training materials teach. To use a track and field analogy, the former is a low hurdle; the latter, a matter for pole vaulters.
As indicated above, some plaintiffs allege that an agent advised them that they did not need flood insurance. Assume for sake of argument that the basis for the recommendation is that the property was not located in Zone A. One problem with the recommendation is that NFIP's publication, "Myths and Facts about the National Flood Insurance Program," begins with the following: "WHO NEEDS FLOOD INSURANCE? EVERYONE." (Emphasis added.) NFIP further reports that 20 to 25 percent of all NFIP paid claims are for property outside areas with the most significant risks of flooding.
With this information available to agents, would a prudent and competent agent recommend against buying flood insurance? Are these facts material? Should a prudent and competent agent know these facts? Shouldn't a prudent and competent agent at least share the NFIP information with clients? Is an agent who is unaware of this information incompetent, thereby failing the competency test, and unable to act prudently as a result? If an agent is aware of this information but does not disclose it, is that an affirmative act of omission? My guess is that if courts are open to examinations of agent training materials (as the language in Leonard suggests) a broadened sense of duty may be imposed on Mississippi agents. Introducing evidence about agent training may further serve to bring common law and regulatory sanctioned standards more closely in alignment.
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