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Additional Insured Issues

Modern Additional Insured Endorsements DO NOT Require Vicarious Liability

Gregory Podolak | September 13, 2024

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A New Jersey federal court took up the question of whether "caused, in whole or in part" means "vicarious liability" in order to secure additional insured coverage. This issue has been actively litigated across the country for many years and the potential impact is significant—if courts adopt a vicarious liability standard, access to additional insured coverage becomes much more challenging (defense) and narrow (indemnity) and will routinely frustrate the risk transfer intent of the parties. However, most courts have rejected it. 1

In aligning with an "overwhelming" majority approach (per the court), the court in Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., Civil Action No. 22-01866 (MAF) (AME), 2024 WL 3287848, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117403 (D.N.J. July 3, 2024), carefully applied interpretative tools for predicting how the New Jersey Supreme Court would rule and correctly concluded that additional insured coverage is not so limited.

Background of the Controversy

The Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO), standard form additional insured endorsement is widely utilized as a risk transfer vehicle throughout the commercial marketplace and, specifically, the construction industry. In its most recent iteration, published in the early 2000s, ISO replaced its longstanding "arising out of" trigger language with the phrase "caused, in whole or in part." While ISO explained this change was made in response to what many observers believed to be an overly broad application of the "arising out of" trigger in case law around the country, many insurance companies seized on the revision to advocate for a far narrower application of coverage to only those circumstances where the named insured was alleged to be vicariously liable for the additional insured.

As the revised amendment was tested, courts rejected the vicarious-liability-only argument in favor of a plain meaning interpretation that additional insured coverage is available as long as the named insured played some causative role—at least in part—in causing the harm. From this initial trend, the body of case law has more fully developed, with at least 16 jurisdictions weighing in on the issue. While a small minority of jurisdictions have sided with the vicarious-only interpretation, a true "majority" approach has emerged, adopting the position that additional insured coverage is not limited to vicarious liability and finding coverage where the named insured is alleged to be at least partially at fault for causing the harm.

The majority approach has recognized that vicarious liability is a very specific legal liability framework (with decades of developed case law) that concentrates only on the liability of one party (here, the additional insured) that exists solely by virtue of its relationship to another (here, the named insured) and thus is essentially coextensive with that party's (the named insured's) own liability. The "caused, in whole or in part" language reflects no such limited scope. If ISO had intended to use the more restricted vicarious liability standard, it need only have used the words "vicarious liability." Rather, the intent was to provide complete additional insured status (subject to all other terms and conditions) as long as the additional insured's liability was caused at least in part by the named insured's acts or omissions.

The Facts and Holding of Navigators v. Citizens

In Navigators, a liability insurer for a general contractor filed a declaratory judgment action against a subcontractor's insurer seeking defense and indemnity for its insured (as an additional insured) for an underlying injury lawsuit filed by an employee of the subcontractor. While the specifics of the contractual insurance and indemnity obligations between the general and subcontractors are not discussed, it was undisputed that the subcontract required the subcontractor to include the general contractor as an additional insured under its policy and that said policy included the standard form additional insured endorsement with a "caused, in whole or in part, by" trigger.

In the underlying suit, the worker alleged injury caused by the negligence of his employer (the subcontractor) and the general contractor. The worker did not allege that the general contractor was vicariously liable for the subcontractor; rather, theories of direct negligence were lodged against both.

After being sued by the worker, the general contractor sought coverage as an additional insured under the subcontractor's policy. The subcontractor's insurer, Citizens Insurance Company of America, denied the general contractor's tender, reasoning that because the worker had not alleged the general contractor to be vicariously liable for its named insured, it was not obligated to provide coverage to the general contractor as an additional insured. The general contractor's insurer, Navigators Specialty Insurance Company, maintained that additional insured coverage was available in direct liability situations so long as the "additional insured is allegedly liable at least in part based on what it itself did."

The New Jersey District Court framed the issue this way: "Does the duty to defend apply in both vicarious and direct liability contexts?" and endeavored to resolve the issue in the absence of any controlling decision from the New Jersey Supreme Court. As a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction, the court had to "predict" how the New Jersey Supreme Court would rule. It predicted that New Jersey's highest court would conclude that the duty to defend is triggered by allegations of vicarious liability or by allegations of direct liability.

In making its prediction (and corresponding ruling), the court relied on its collective reasoning derived from the following four sources.

  • Lower court decisions in New Jersey
  • A New Jersey federal decision
  • Decisions from other federal courts throughout the United States
  • The plain and ordinary meaning of the insurance policy

Lower Court Decisions in New Jersey

The court found that the issue had been decided by only three New Jersey courts—two intermediate appellate courts and one trial court. Of those three, there was a 2–1 split, with one appellate court and one trial court finding that the "caused, in whole or in part" language was not limited to cases involving vicarious liability. Because the state court decisions did not reflect a "deep consensus as to what the law is," the court reasoned those decisions supplied some indication as to how the New Jersey Supreme Court would rule, but "not a strong one."

Federal Decision in New Jersey

The court located one federal case that analyzed "the same operative language … and concluded that the duty to defend is triggered by allegations of either vicarious or direct liability." In the court's view, this one prior decision "move[d] the needle to an extent," but the court continued its quest for conclusive authority.

Other Federal Court Decisions

In total, the court located 19 other decisions, finding that "[t]he overwhelming majority rule is that the Insurance Contract's 'caused, in whole or in part, by' language is consistent with a duty to defend that applies in both direct and vicarious liability contexts." As to the overwhelming nature of such "majority rule," the Navigators court found that federal courts applying the law of the following jurisdictions had reached consensus in 15 prior cases (not including the prior federal New Jersey decision).

  • Indiana
  • Kentucky
  • Tennessee (two decisions)
  • Massachusetts
  • Ohio
  • Pennsylvania
  • Louisiana (two decisions)
  • Maryland
  • Montana
  • Connecticut
  • Wyoming
  • Maine
  • Texas

The court also recognized "a small minority" (four prior cases) of federal courts applying the law of the following states and finding a vicarious liability trigger.

  • Florida (two decisions)
  • Maryland
  • Illinois

Notably, the court believed the "consensus is especially important" in predicting how the New Jersey Supreme Court would rule because "a federal court should generally analyze the question using the same interpretative approach that the state supreme court applies in the relevant area of the law." The court further noted that, "when interpreting a standard-form insurance contract, of the kind that is at issue here, the New Jersey Supreme Court has consistently pursued a particular interpretive approach."

We look to whether there is a consensus among our sister jurisdictions over the interpretation to be given to the language of the form insurance contract. We do that because we assume that, where stock language has been uniformly interpreted in a particular way, sophisticated commercial entities are aware of that interpretation and that it has informed their understanding of the contract provision at issue.

In finding that "a national consensus has indeed developed" as respects the coverage trigger for additional insureds under the "caused, in whole or in part, by" language, the court predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court "will reach the same bottom-line conclusions as its many 'sister jurisdictions.'"

The Plain and Ordinary Meaning of the Policy

Finally, in construing the additional insured endorsement, the court reasoned that it extended coverage "to liability for 'bodily injury' caused, in whole or in part by the named insured's acts or omissions, or the acts or omissions of those acting on the named insured's behalf" and that nothing in the language "purport[ed] to limit coverage to an 'injury' that is 'caused' in one particular way or another, direct or vicarious."

Thus, based on the court's careful consideration of prior New Jersey state and federal precedent, the "national consensus" across other jurisdictions, and the plain meaning of the policy, the court ruled that coverage for the general contractor's defense was triggered by allegations of direct negligence under the ISO standard "caused, in whole or in part by" language of the additional insured endorsement.

Considerations and Takeaways

The Navigators court's ruling and analysis are significant for several reasons. First, the court quite clearly announced that there is a national consensus that the "caused, in whole or in part, by" language does not require allegations of vicarious liability. While the court appropriately observed that such consensus has been reached by a majority of jurisdictions analyzing the issue, it is critical to remember that this issue has not reached all jurisdictions—particularly not at the appellate level. Nonetheless, this author agrees that, based on the body of case law now existing, it is fair to characterize the court's holding as the majority rule.

Second, and despite the momentum behind the "majority rule," it is critical to remember that a minority rule also exists. In those jurisdictions such as Florida, the vicarious-only rule has received the stamp of approval from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Given that many jurisdictions have not decided the issue, and with at least one federal appellate court siding with the minority, there is still considerable uncertainty in how those now undecided jurisdictions will eventually rule. Thus, for insureds in the minority and undecided jurisdictions, careful consideration must be made when effectuating risk transfer and pause given before relying on standard form additional insured endorsements to accomplish intended goals.

Despite the remaining uncertainty and in this author's opinion, the Navigators court continued to pave the way for other courts to join the majority. While not a focal point of the court's analysis, a critical factor was identified: the importance of consensus in interpreting standard form insurance contracts. As the court aptly recognized, many insureds—and especially the more sophisticated insureds—depend on a predictable (and uniform) interpretation of the insurance products they purchase. With that in mind and in addition to the legal analysis employed to interpret "caused, in whole or in part," which this author agrees does not operate to limit coverage in vicarious liability situations, the importance of a predictable interpretative approach to standard insurance forms should also remain a key consideration for courts that have yet to address this issue.


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Footnotes

1

Special thanks to Jonathan W. Chambers for coauthoring this article.